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BOOK REVIEW
THE TWILIGHT OF ORGANIZATIONAL FORM
FOR CHARITY: MUSINGS ON NORMAN SILBER,
A CORPORATE FORM OF FREEDOM. THE
EMERGENCE OF THE MODERN NONPROFIT
SECTOR
NORMAN I. SILBER, A CORPORATE FORM OF FREEDOM:
THE EMERGENCE OF THE MODERN NONPROFrr SECTOR.

Boulder: Westview Press, 2001. Pp. 184
Evelyn Brody*
In the months following the September 11 attacks, the nonprofit
sector took center stage. But with prominence comes scrutiny, and the
extraordinary role of private philanthropy in this context has raised
uncomfortable questions. First, over 250 new nonprofit organizations
formed to handle the outpouring of contributions, and the Internal
Revenue Service announced expedited review for new applications for
federal tax exemption.' Yet these organizations-along with existing
major charities like the American Red Cross and the Salvation Armyfound themselves tripping over each other, unable to ensure that the
more than $1.5 billion in contributions was being distributed wisely,
* Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law.
1. See IRS News Release, No. IR-2001-82, Sept. 18, 2001, available at
http:llwww.irs.gov/pubirs-news/ir-01-82.pdf (last visited June 11, 2002). The release stated, in
pertinent part:
The IRS ... has established a special expedited review and approval process for new
organizations seeking tax-exempt status to provide relief to the [September 11]
victims. New organizations should apply for tax-exempt status by filing IRS Form
1023, available at www.irs.gov and write at the top of the form "Disaster Relief, Sept.
11,2001." The IRS will give such applications immediate attention.
Id. As of June 11, 2002, the IRS had recognized the exempt status of 284 new organizations formed
for the purpose of providing relief to September 11 victims. See Internal Revenue Service: The
Digital Daily, at http:llwww.irs.gov/exemptldisplay/O,,il=3&genericld=20932,00.html (last visited
June 11, 2002).
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fairly and expeditiously.- Wouldn'tfewer charities be better? Second, the
fund raising practices of some of the charities-notably the Red Crossbrought charges of deceptive charitable solicitation practices.' It turns
out that some charities had a different purpose in mind than merely
functioning as a conduit to victims. 4 But isn't the point of organized
philanthropy its value added? Professionals experienced in the range and
long-term effects of a multitude of calamities can minimize the
particularism that characterizes individualized, as opposed to
governmental, relief: The private donations, when added to the billions
in federal relief and untold billions in private insurance and other
governmental assistance, prompts the question of whether the victims of
this particular disaster might reap a windfall.' Third, the "dark side" of
the sector came disturbingly to light with the federal government's
freezing of assets of the Holy Land Foundation and a few domestic

2. See, e.g., David Barstow, $850 Millionfor Charity,Not CentrallyMonitored, N.Y. TIMES.
Oct. 11, 2001, at B I ("There are hundreds of disaster organizations, nonprofit groups, foundations.
government agencies and corporations involved .... [Dlonations are also piling up because many
of the new relief funds still do not have the basic elements of governance in place. such as boards of
directors, mission statements, written standards.").
3. This finding was echoed in an August 2002 report on the American Red Cross posted by
the Better Business Bureau's Wise Giving Alliance, a charity rating agency. See
http://www.give.orglreports/arc.asp (last visited Sept. 27, 2002). The controversy forced the board
of the Red Cross to demand the resignation of its director, Bemadine Healy. See, e.g., Nightline:
Did She Quit or Was She Pushed, and Why, As America Fights Back (ABC News Broadcast, Oct.
26, 2001) (transcript on file with the Hofstra Law Review). A congressional body held hearings into
the performance of September 11 philanthropies. See List of Witnesses to Appear Before Cotniuttee
on Ways and Means Subconmittee on Oversight on Response by Charitable Organizations to
Recent Terrorist Attacks, available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/oversite/l07conglov7wit.htm (last visited June 11, 2002), containing links to prepared statements. Shortly thereafter, the
Red Cross promised to spend the balance of the principal of the Liberty Fund on the victims and
their families, and named former Senator George Mitchell to develop a plan of distribution.
Accepting Mitchell's recommendation that "recipients of these monies are in the best position to
assess their own immediate and long-term needs," the Red Cross announced that ninety percent of
the nearly $1 billion raised would be distributed by the first anniversary of the attacks. See
http://www.redcross.org/pressldisaster/ds.pr/02013Olibertyfund.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2002).
The Red Cross slightly reduced this percentage when it unexpectedly continued to receive another
couple of hundred million dollars. It also expressed concern about jeopardizing its tax exemption by
distributing living expenses to families that had no financial need. See Quarterly Report on the
Liberty Fund (through July 31, 2002), at http://www.redcross.org.
4. See supra note 3.
5. See, e.g., Diana B. Henriques & David Barstow, Victims' Fund Likely to Pay A verage of
$1.6 Million Each, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2001, at Al (describing distribution plan of federal
compensation fund established by Congress for the families of victims who elect to waive their right
to sue; awards would be reduced by life insurance, pension payments, or other government
assistance, but not by charity); Thomas Connor, Terror Victims Aren't Entitled to Compensation,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2002, at A18 (comparing public payments for various terrorist acts. and
proposing that the notion of "compensation" be replaced with need-based "compassionate aid"l.
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Muslim groups.6 An organization whose purposes can be carried out
only through illegal activities clearly violates public policy; but what
about multipurpose bona fide charities that incidentally engage in illegal
activities?
Although unprecedented in scale, the questions raised by
September 11 philanthropy have eternally troubled policy makers. To
generalize from these examples, debate constantly revolves around what,
if any, role the state should play in three key areas: (1) preventing
duplication of charitable services, with its attendant inefficient use of
resources; (2) protecting donors, from both misleading fundraising
drives and look-alike charities; and (3) restricting "charitable" purposes
and activities, for nonprofit corporate status and, separately, tax
exemption. To complicate matters, the state itself consists of multiple
players-which decisions should be left to legislatures, attorneys general
and other regulators, and judges?
In time to help us understand this legal state of affairs is a
provocative and illuminating historical study of American nonprofit
corporate law by Norman Silber.' Professor Silber challenges the
modern nonprofit scholar and practitioner-accustomed to autonomy for
charities-to consider living under quite a different regime.9 While state
practices varied, American discomfort with the corporate form persisted
in the nonprofit realm long after business incorporation became
standardized.' For most of the twentieth century, several states-notably
New York and Pennsylvania-continued to treat the grant of a nonprofit
charter as a privilege." And not just by the state legislature: Judges and
administrators endeavored to avoid the perceived evils of wasteful
duplication of charitable services; names that might cause confusion
with an existing (and competing) nonprofit; and unpatriotic planned
activities, if not purposes.' 2 Professor Silber, however, finds that
discretion by judges "became so strong that their personal reservations6. See, e.g., Noreen S. Ahmed-Ullah & Laurie Cohen, Muslims Now Hesitant to Give; Fear
About U.S. Scrutiny Raises Conflict with Key Doctrine of Islam, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 30, 2001, Metro
section, at 1; Lisa Getter et al., Islamic American Nonprofits Face IncreasedScrutiny in U.S., L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 4, 2001, at Al; Judith Miller, U.S. to Block Assets It Says Help FinanceHamnas Killers.
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4,2001, at A9.
7. See Evelyn Brody, The Limits of Charity Fiduciary Law, 57 MD. L. REv. 1400, 1405
(1998) [hereinafter Brody, FiduciaryLaw].
8. NORMAN I. SILBER, A CORPORATE FORM OF FREEDOM: THE EMERGENCE OF THE
MODERN NONPROFIT SECTOR (westview Press, 2001).
9. See id. at 9.
10. Seeid. at5-6.
11. See id.
12. See id.
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religious, political, class, cultural, racial, and social-as a matter of legal
doctrine were sufficient to sanction disapproval."1 3 Inevitably, state
paternalism came to be perceived as state suppression of nonmajoritarian
and unpopular causes.' 4 In the sweep of 1960s civil rights reforms
celebrating diversity and individual expression, the grant of nonprofit
corporate status was reconceptualized from a privilege to an
entitlement.'5 Today, filing a certificate of incorporation for a nonprofit
corporation is merely one item on a law firm associate's checklist in
setting up a new charity.
I.

THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION

Professor Silber's fascinating exploration of a near-century of
jurisprudential subjectivity reveals an extraordinary hunger for
uniformity in the conception of the public good. (Don't forget that the
Justices of the New York Supreme Court are elected).1 6 World War I
brought a suspicion of national-identity groups, out of fear that they
foster "dual fealty."'' 7 Similarly, Justices were skeptical that advocacy
groups ("propagandists") could promote the social order.'8 Other forms
of heterodoxy were disapproved-a New York judge rejected the charter
of a Jewish group whose board would meet on Sundays.' 9 (Not
surprisingly, one Justice Levy in a later case held that the work of
charities was not "labor" and so would not be violating Sabbath laws).20
Professor Silber also finds a few more-thoughtful jurists. He
recounts with evident appreciation the outcome of cases where Justice
Levy denied approval to the charter of a particularly unsettling
organization (one of the Nazi-supporting Bunds), 2' and granted approval
to an unconventional but desperately needed group (an organization that
rescued Jewish children from Nazi Germany). 22 A pro-American
patriotic group went too far in calling for amendments to the
13. Id.at5.
at 6.
14. See id.
at 115.
15. See id.
16. A stylistic delight augments Professor Silber's legal realism: For each decision by a
Justice of the New York Supreme Court, Professor Silber provides a biographical note based on the
jurist's obituary that later appeared in The New York Times.
17. SILBER, supra note 8, at 39-40.
18. See id. at 40-41.
19. See id. at 32.
20. See id. at 42.
21. See id. at 53-54, 76 n.165 (describing In re General Von Steuben Bund, Inc., 287 N.Y.S.
527 (Sup. Ct. 1936)).
22. See id.at 51, 75 n.154 (describing In re German Jewish Children's Aid, 272 N.Y.S. 540
(Sup. Ct. 1934)).
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Constitution that would provide for the forfeiture of the U.S. citizenship
of those who join any organization supporting the overthrow of the
government by force or violence, or who write, publish, or possess for
purposes of circulation materials expressing such views.2 The Justice
found it "'unthinkable that approval should be given on behalf of the
people of the State of New York to anyone to incorporate for 24the
purpose of advocating a constitutional amendment of this character.'
Once the exigencies of the Second World War faded, however,
continuing trial court hostility to civil rights groups in the 1950s
provoked a fatal backlash to judicial discretion.2' In 1961, the New York
Court of Appeals effectively ended the practice when it ordered the
lower court to approve the charter of a white supremacist group. 26 In
Associationfor the Preservation of Freedom of Choice, Inc.,27 the trial
judge had rejected the certificate of incorporation of a hate group, ruling:
"Our system of government can only be maintained by the free and
untrammeled collision of ideas, but when those ideas run counter to the
mores or policies of our laws, no group should be permitted to organize
in corporateform with the sanction of the state to espouse such ideas." '
The New York high court reversed, 29 declaring:
[Agitating] for the repeal or modification of any law. . ., provided such
agitation is not coupled with the advocacy of force and violence[,] ...
is not against public policy whether indulged in by an individual or a
membership corporation, but of course approval of a corporate charter
devoted to such a purpose does not imply approval of the views of its
sponsors. It simply means that their expression is lawful, and their
sponsors entitled to a vehicle for such expression under a statute which
cannot constitutionally be made available only to those who are in
harmony with the majority viewpoint."
At the same time that he chronicles the loss of the state's
gatekeeper role in regulating incorporation, however, Professor Silber
probes whether incorporation ever conveyed much information about the

23.
24.
1945)).
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

See id. at 56-57.
Id. at 57 (quoting In re Patriotic Citizenship Ass'n, Inc., 53 N.Y.S.2d 595, 597 (Sup. Ct.
See id. at 99-107.
See id. at 113.
188 N.Y.S.2d 885 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
Id. at 889.
174 N.E.2d 487 (N.Y. 1961).
Id. at 490.
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worthiness of a particular organization." What difference would it have
made if the Bund were granted corporate status? Why should the Jewish
rescue organization have had to prove itself to the state? Moreover, as
Professor Silber writes: "There is no clear way to measure the harm that
free speech suffered and/or the social cohesiveness gained by
discretionary review. 32 How a nonprofit operates has more social
significance. Thus, the notion of a benevolent despot who safeguards
society by preventing the formation of harmful nonprofit corporations
appeals to a false, unattainable, and undesirable god. While we might
wish for the simplicity of identifying "good" and "bad" charities based
on their organizational documents, even the most disturbing organization
can dress up its purposes with the right-sounding words, and the
regulator's job only begins at the moment of birth. The current approach
conforms to the American bias against ascribing legal significance to
individuals based on their status, as opposed to their actions.
The aspect of judicial screening that sought to eliminate "harmful"
competition between charities might evoke more sympathy, but, in the
end, proves equally futile and misguided.33 Superficially, one can
appreciate the sentiment expressed by Justice Stoddart: "I do not believe
the public should have numerous groups soliciting funds when one wellrecognized and well-operated organization is [already] seeking their
contributions. 34 However, the marketplace for contributions remains an
31. See SILBER, supra note 8, at 128-29. A charity can form as a trust rather than in corporate
form-although the tortured history of the validity of charitable trusts in New York and
Pennsylvania itself could fill a book (and has filled parts of several). See Trs. of Phila. Baptist Ass'n
v. Hart's Ex'rs, 4 U.S. 1, 48-50 (1819) (declaring invalid charitable trusts in those states that failed
to adopt statutes to replace English ones repealed after the Revolution-including the 1601 Statute
of Charitable Uses). Hart was effectively reversed by Vidal v. Mayor, Aldennan and Citizens of
Philadelphia, 43 U.S. 127 (1844) (finding evidence that charitable trusts existed at common law
independent of Statute of Charitable Uses). See also Tilden v. Green, 28 N.E. 880 (N.Y. 18911
(holding charitable testamentary trust invalid due to lack of certainty of beneficiary). See generally
CARL ZOLLMAN, AMERICAN LAW OF CHARITIES (1924); HOWARD S. MILLER, THE LEGAL
FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN PHILANTHROPY, 1776-1844 (1961); MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH,

FOUNDATIONS AND GOVERNMENT (1965); Stanley N. Katz, Barry Sullivan & C. Paul Beach, Legal
Change and Legal Autonomy: CharitableTrusts in New York, 1777-1893, 3 LAW & HIST. REV. 51
(1985); PETER DOBKIN HALL, INVENTING THE NONPROFIT SECTOR (1992).

Nor does denial of a charter make the activity illegal. "Unincorporated associations,
which do not ask the approval of the Supreme Court or the sanction and help of the state itself,
ought to be just as able as any corporation to achieve the ends that these signers are aiming at,"
declared one New York Justice in denying the charter of a group that wanted to convert Jews to
Christianity. In re Am. Jewish Evangelization Soc'y, Inc., 50 N.Y.S.2d 236, 237 (Sup. Ct. 1944)
(discussed in SILBER, supra note 8, at 61).
32.

SILBER, supra note 8, at 65.

33. See id.
34. In re Waldemar Cancer Research Ass'n, 130 N.Y.S.2d 426, 426-27 (Sup. Ct. 1954). For
this and other examples, see SILBER, supra note 8, at 62-63 and accompanying notes.
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important check on older institutions, which in any case enjoy the
advantages of greater name recognition and established reputation in
attracting donative support. The regulator still can play an important role
in seeking to ensure the efficient use of charitable resources: The New
York Attorney General prodded the September 11 charities into
privately coordinating their relief efforts by creating a combined
database. 5 As Professor Silber chronicles, the problem of fraudulent
charitable solicitation has come to be addressed by regulatory agencies
whose jurisdiction extends to all fundraisers, incorporated or
unincorporated. 6
In the end, judicial discretion over charity incorporation fell during
the general social rebellion against orthodoxy, the rise of advocacy and
identity groups (notably the NAACP), the legal-process reform against
ad hoc judicial rulings in favor of administrative deliberation and
consistency, and the reconception of property rights to include
government licenses.37 Entertaining as well as erudite, Professor Silber's
account of the transformation of New York law reads like a detective
story with a bevy of improbable heroes: students. s He observes that the
majority opinion by the New York Court of Appeals in Preservationof
Freedom of Choice cites no authorities-no case law-other than
academic pieces, including three student law review notes. 9 The great
irony that Professor Silber observes is that the corporate form no longer
was the bane of liberals, but rather their salvation: as his book is titled, a
"corporate form of freedom."'
II.

THE NEXT HISTORY

In the concluding sections of his book, Professor Silber probes
whether some of the continuing problems in nonprofit governance can
be addressed through a tighter process for defining charity.4' These final
35. It appeared from press reports that the Attorney General initially sought public
involvement, if not control, over such a database, but yielded to charities' concerns over
confidentiality. For a description of an umbrella group for the major New York human services
charities, see the webpage on the New York Attorney General's website, WTC Relief Info, at
http:lAvww.wtcrelief.info/CharitiesllnformationlpagesNews.jsp?newslD=9 (posted Dec. 14, 2001)
(on file with the Hofstra Law Review). See also supranote 3 and accompanying text.
36. See SILBER, supra note 8, at 93, 148-49. Professor Silber examines the deficiencies of the
regulatory schemes for fundraising, describing the paucity of monitoring and investigation. See id.
at 148-49.
37. See SILBER, supranote 8, at 93-107.
38. See id. at 114.
39. See id. at 114-15. See generally id. at 101-13 (discussing the academic pieces).
40. See id. at 102.
41. See id. at 172.
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thoughts, though, have a tentative quality, and are the least satisfying
part of Professor Silber's book. And not surprisingly-after all,
Professor Silber himself just presented such a persuasive case against
case-by-case definition of charity that he finds it difficult to articulate an
argument for state supervision at the organizational stage. 42
Consider tax exemption, which has come to be seen as the "'true'
subsidy by the state. ' 43 Professor Silber asserts: "the problem for the
next generation of lawmakers and policymakers would be to find a way
to redraw the line between privilege and entitlement to the advantages of
nonprofit organization without allowing inappropriate actors to make
objectionable, discretionary value judgments."' But it turns out that
there are turtles all the way down: Congress has shown little appetite for
defining "charitable" any more narrowly than do the states-the key
modifications being for activities that pester politicians, like political
activity and excessive lobbying. 5 Moreover, despite the view of the IRS
as the charity regulator of last resort, Congress has never explicitly
granted the IRS plenary equity authority over charities,46 and hardly
funds its exempt-organization division at a level sufficient to fully
monitor and supervise the sector.
Like all good histories, Professor Silber's monograph serves as a
cautionary tale: By illustrating how inherently political (in the broad
sense) is the answer to the question "how private is private
42. See id. at 169-74.
43. Id. at 9.
44. Id. In the 1969 Tax Reform Act, Congress adopted two major changes to the taxexemption regime available to charities. First, it required charities (excepting only churches and
small organizations) that sought tax recognition of tax exemption under Internal Revenue Code
section 501(c)(3) to apply for a ruling from the IRS. See I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(3), 508. Second, Congress
adopted tighter disclosure rules and other constraints on those tax-exempt charities classified as
"private foundations." See id. §§ 508(b), 509, 4940-48. While Congress grants some types of
charities (notably, schools and hospitals) automatic nonprivate foundation status, other newly
formed organizations cannot establish their entitlement to nonprivate foundation status until a
testing period has elapsed. See id. §§ 501(e)-(f), 508(a). Accordingly, the IRS will issue a
provisional ruling on this aspect of their application for recognition of exemption. The IRS'
threshold recognition of exemption under section 501(c)(3) is not, however, provisional, as
Professor Silber suggests. See SILBER, supra note 8, at 153, 170.
45. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (granting charity status only if "no substantial part of the activities
of [the organization] is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence
legislation..., and [the organization] does not participate in, or intervene in ... , any political
campaign ....). Nor does Professor Silber see why tax exemption should be conditioned on a
narrower conception of the public good than should nonprofit corporate status. See SILBER, supra
note 8, at 156-58. See generally Evelyn Brody, Of Sovereignty and Subsidy: Conceptualizing the
CharityTax Exemption, 23 J. CORP. L. 585 (1998).
46. See Evelyn Brody, A Taxing Time for the Bishop Estate: What Is the I.R.S. Role in
CharityGovernance?,21 U. HAW. L. REV. 537, 543 (1999).
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philanthropy?," he helps us to appreciate why we cannot go back to a
gatekeeper role for the charity regulator. The history of the next period
of the charitable sector will consider more fundamental issues. I believe
that understanding charity accountability today takes us from the
legitimacy of state oversight to the role of extra-legal institutions to a
questioning of the significance of organizational form.
A. Accountability of the Regulator
Regulators suffer from a lack of transparency in their charity
oversight, making it impossible to assess their effectiveness in
improving charity governance--or even whether they are acting at all. 47
Moreover, state attorneys general might act out of parochial motives.
Perhaps the sector should call on state charity officials and the IRS to
publish annual reports explaining, at least in general terms, both the
level and types of enforcement and outcomes achieved.
B.

"Private" Regulation

Formal law is probably the institution that least influences and
improves charity governance and performance. 4 Over the decades,
private regulation of charitable activity has occurred through religious
institutions, scientific philanthropy, federated philanthropy, charities
bureaus, community foundations, and state and national associations of
nonprofit organizations. As described above with respect to the
September 11 charities, donor and public expectations (and news media)
can bring faster and more lasting changes than can government
prosecution.4 9 As the Attorney General of New York showed,
government can play a prescriptive, in addition to enforcement, role."
47. As I have described elsewhere, few cases involving nonprofit fiduciary issues reach the
courts. Reform rather than punishment is generally the regulator's goal, and charities prefer a
chance to improve their behavior while avoiding embarrassment and personal liability. "Closing
agreements" between the regulator and the charity to end an enforcement action can be quite
detailed, often spelling out specific terms dealing with future governance. Sometimes regulators will
settle only if the charity assents to public disclosure of the agreement, which otherwise would be
confidential. See Brody, Fiduciary Law, supranote 7, at 1410-11.
48. See generallyEvelyn Brody, InstitutionalDissonance in the Nonprofit Sector, 41 VILL. L.
REV. 433 (1996) [hereinafter Brody, InstitutionalDissonance]; Evelyn Brady, Accountability, and
Public Trust, in THE STATE OF NONPROFIT AMERIcA (Lester Salamon, ed., Brookings Institution
Press and the Aspen Institute) (forthcoming 2002).
49. See supranotes 1-4 and accompanying text.
50. See, for example, the "Years in Review" published by the Pennsylvania Attorney General,
containing summaries of significant cases brought by the Charitable Trusts and Organizations
Section. Years 1997-2000 are available at http:llwww.attomeygeneral.gov/pei/years.cfm (last
visited Sept. 26, 2002). For a proposal for public-private collaboration, see Joel Fleishman, Public
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I do not suggest, however, that the law should be tightened to
codify these institutional dictates, because institutional dictates can be as
misguided as they are strong. Notably, Professor Silber advocates
"tailored and standardized" disclosure rules regarding "such matters as
the use to which funds solicited have been applied, salaries, overhead
costs, and other information.""1 Were it only so easy! A fierce debate has
longed raged over how to categorize fungible dollars-to achieve
meaningful and not just uniform reporting. Think of the practical
pressures on a charity trying to raise funds from a public ignorant of the
charity's fiscal requirements. After all, many people think that providing
charity is a free good-and so general overhead, much less fund raising
expenses, should be zero. Unfortunately, one of the great lost
opportunities of the September 11 experience was the failure of charities
to defend the costs of wisely allocating charitable resources. If any
charity had the reputation to explain costs of overhead, it was the
American Red Cross; once the public outcry grew over how it intended
to distribute the money contributed to its Liberty Fund, however, the
charity was forced into such a retreat that it even asserted that all

Trust in Not-for-Profit Organizationsanzd the Need for Regulatory Reform. in PHILANTHROPY AND
THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 172 (Charles T. Clotfelter & Thomas Ehrich eds., 1999). Distinguishing
between two aspects of charity governance, Professor Fleishman would leave the nonprofit sector to
address "unwise, injudicious, or careless-but not illegal-patterns of actions by bona fide not-forprofit organizations," while confining government enforcement action to fraudulent behavior by
those acting "under cover of a fake not-for-profit mask." Id. at 186. He then advocates for joint
efforts by the sector and government. See id. at 187. Finally, if the two prior strategies fail, as a last
resort Professor Fleishman would adopt a new federal agency (subordinate to state enforcement)
whose powers would be limited to procedural issues, rather than program content, and which would
generally "defer to state accountability-enforcing authorities who have earned the reputation for
effective action .... Id. at 187-91.
For an international regulatory comparison, see the Charity Commission for England and
Wales at http://www.charity-commission.gov.uk (last visited June 6, 2002). In addition to
registering and regulating charities, this body assists charities in improving operations. and
publishes such documents as "The Hallmarks of a Well-Run Charity." Note that the English
company statute does not have a separate corporate form for charities. See Charity Commission for
England
and
Wales,
Publications:
Quick
Links
at
http:/vww.charitycommission.gov.uk/publications/ccpubs3.asp (last visited June 6, 2002); Department of Trade and
Industry, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Final Report URN 01/942 and URN
01/943 at 86-88, §§ 4.63-4.67, available at http://www.dti.gov.uk/cld/final-report/index.htm (last
visited Apr. 12, 2002) (recommending such an organizational form); see also Charity Commission
for England and Wales, PR25/01: The Charitable Incorporated Organisation (CIO) - the Future for
Charities available at http://www.charity-commission.gov.uk (July 26, 2001) (last visited June 6,
2002).
51. SILBER, supranote 8, at 171.
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overhead52 costs of the Fund's activity would be borne from other
sources.

C. The Twilight of OrganizationalFormfor Charity?
Ultimately, Professor Silber still believes that we can invest the
nonprofit corporate charter with legal significance for the benefit of the
public-although he would augment the regime by requiring provisional
charters and periodic reviews. I, on the other hand, have become an
organizational-form agnostic: While supporting periodic regulatory
review of charity operations, why should the public care whether the
entity forms as a trust, a corporation, or an unincorporated association?"
After all, the consequences of falling to satisfy legal standards should
meaningfully relate to a state interest-loss of tax exemption, say, rather
than loss of limited liability protection for organizing as a corporation.5
52. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (describing Congressional hearings into how the
Red Cross (among others) was intending to honor the wishes of donors). We need to appreciate that
a state attorney general wears two potentially conflicting hats: to protect consumers and to oversee
the wise expenditure of charitable resources. Focusing exclusively on the first role, as the New York
Attorney General appeared to do, risks treating charities as mere agents of donors, without regard to
the greater social good that can be accomplished with now-charitable resources.
53. See SILBER, supranote 8, at 170-71.
54. See generally Brody, Fiduciary Law, supra note 7; Evelyn Brody, Charities in Tax
Reform: Threats to Subsidies Overt and Coven, 66 TENN. L. REv. 687 (1999) [hereinafter Brody,
Ta Reform].
55. Thus, the hate group Association for the Preservation of Freedom of Choice, as discussed
above, might be a nonprofit corporation, but it will not likely be entitled to federal income tax
exemption. See, e.g., Nationalist Movement v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue. 102 T.C. 558 (1994),
affid per curiam, 37 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 1994) (denying section 501(c)(3) status to an organization
chartered under Mississippi lav as a "'a non-profit charitable, educational and fraternal organization
dedicated to advancing American freedom, American democracy and American nationalism'").
I doubt that Professor Silber would support the approach either of the Charity
Commission in England with respect to the Church of Scientology or of the Attorney General of
Illinois with respect to the World Church of the Creator. See Decision of the Charity Commissoners
[sic]
for
England
and
Wales,
available
at
http://www.charitycommission.uk.gov/registration.pdfs/costfulldoe.pdf (Nov. 17, 1999) (last visited June 6, 2002)
[hereinafter Decision:England and Wales]; People ex rel. Ryan v. World Church of the Creator,
760 N.E.2d 953 (111.2001). In England, the Charity Commission rejected the application of the
Church of Scientology (England and Vales) to register as a charity, on the grounds that it was not a
religion and its core activities of "auditing" and "training" provide private, rather than a public,
benefit. See Decision: England and Wales, supra; see also Debra Morris. Church of Scientology is
Denied Charitable Status by the Charity Commission, 28 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REv. 219 (2000);
Rosamund Smith et al., The Parity of Charity, LAw. 39 (Mar. 19, 2001) ("charity lawyers are
waiting to see whether an appeal will be lodged and whether the [European] Human Rights Act will
be invoked"). In Illinois, the Attorney General sought to freeze the assets of a white supremacist
group, The World Church of the Creator, for failing to register as a charity. See People ex rel. Ryan,
760 N.E.2d at 955. The organization succeeded in having the statute voided as unconstitutionally
vague, but the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the statute. See id. at 963. Incidentally, in its
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Most recently, the debate over the legal relevance of organizational form
has focused on the extent to which an attorney general's common law
authority over charitable trusts extends to the activities and decisions of
charities taking the nonprofit corporate form. 6 Incidentally, in its
application for sales-tax exemption, the organization had been denied
charity status by the Illinois Department of Revenue.
Moreover, the nonprofit organization (in any form) itself is
continuing to diminish in importance. Under federal welfare reform and
devolution, states can contract with for-profit providers as well as
nonprofits for social services. s Medicare "vouchers" are good at forprofit, nonprofit, and public hospitals; similarly, demand-side tax
credits, such as the education credits, can be used for tuition paid to any
type of accredited institution." The state of Pennsylvania just turned
over the management of the Philadelphia public schools to Edison
Schools, a private company.9
As Professor Silber's study shows, we can add the act of obtaining
nonprofit corporate status to the list of once-hotly-debated legal issues
that no longer trouble us, but whose ghostly outlines remain. To the
perplexity of law students, corporate statutes continue to explicitly grant
perpetual life, the right to acquire and alienate property, and the power to
sue and be sued.0 Going forward, the legal system will concern itself
more with the harder questions of regulating charitable activity, and less
with how charitable activity is organized.

application for sales-tax exemption, the organization had been denied charity status by the Illinois
Department of Revenue. See Kirsten Schamberg, Smith's Legacy of Hate and Fear;,Six Months
After Benjamin Smith's Spree, The Pain He Inflicted is Far From Over, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 3, 2000,
at 1.
56. See, e.g., Michael W. Peregrine, CorporateLaw Developments for Exempt Organizations,
29 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 21 (2001) (describing recent attorney general actions against nonprofit
corporate health care systems, a museum and a university).
57. See Brody, Institutional Dissonance,supra note 48, at 451.
58. See Brody, Tax Reform, supra note 54, at 706-07; Andrew Ruskin, Empowering Patients
to Act Like Consumers: A ProposalCreatingPrice and Quality Choice Within Health Care, 73 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 651, 668-69 (1999).
59. See, e.g., Jacques Steinberg, hI Largest Schools Takeover, State Will Run Philadelphia's,
N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 22, 2001, at Al.
60. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 202 (McKinney 1986).
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NOTE
MODERN APPLICATION OF THE CUBAN
ADJUSTMENT ACT OF 1966 AND HELMSBURTON: ADDING INSULT TO INJURY
"Remember, remember always that all of us, and you and I
especially, are descendedfrom immigrants and revolutionists."
-President FranklinD. Roosevelt'
I. INTRODUCTION

In the summer of 1955, while in the Mexican apartment of Cuban
exile Maria Antonia Gonzalez, two young and well-educated men, one a
doctor and the other a lawyer, met and developed a friendship that would
eventually form the core of the Cuban revolution. These two
revolutionaries were Fidel Castro and Ernesto "Che" Guevara.3 Around
the one year anniversary of their meeting, Fidel Castro and "Che"
Guevara, along with eighty other men departed Mexico from Tuxpan in
an overloaded thirty-eight-foot sea vessel named The Granma.4 Their
destination was the Oriente Province of Cuba and upon arrival during
the predawn hours of December 2, 1956, the Cuban revolution had
begun.' Having been detected, the revolutionary assault met heavy
gunfire upon reaching the shore.6 Forced to disband and regroup inland,
the original group of eighty-two men would eventually be reduced to

1. JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 972 (1968) (quoting President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt during a speech before the Daughters of the American Revolution on April 21, 1938).
2. See JON LEE ANDERSON, CHE GUEVARA: A REVOLUTIONARY LIFE 165, 173, 175 (1997);
see also HUGH THOMAS, CUBA: THE PuRsutrrOFFREEDOM 809-10, 878, 881 (1971).
3. See ANDERSON, supra note 2, at 175 (quoting a diary entry by "Che" describing his
perception of meeting Fidel Castro for the first time as a "political occurrence" and noting humbly,
"I think there is a mutual sympathy between us").
4. See id. at 204,207; see also THOMAS, supranote 2, at 894.
5. See ANDERSON, supra note 2, at 212.
6. Seeid. at212-13.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2002

13

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 4 [2002], Art. 4
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:1273

only twenty-two. 7 Nevertheless, a little over two years later, on January
8, 1959, Fidel Castro would arrive in the capital city of Havana,
victorious and hailed as a savior and hero.8 The Cuban dictator,
Fulgencio Batista, was ousted from power and had fled the island days
prior to Castro's arrival in Havana.9 The departure of Batista would mark
the beginning of Cuban immigration to the United States.'0
Immigration of Cuban citizens to the United States subsequent to
Batista's overthrow by the Castro revolution can be generally
categorized within six stages." The first stage, approximating 215,000
refugees, was comprised of industrialists, landowners and others directly
affected by Castro's immediate alterations to the political structure in
Cuba.' 2 This group immigrated freely between 1959 3and 1962, mostly
through commercial flights still permitted at the time.'
The second stage of immigration, dating from 1962 to 1965,
experienced a sharp decrease in refugees-totaling about 74,000.' 4 This
group included family members of exiles already in the United States as
well as those able to depart Cuba through "clandestine means'" or via
restricted travel to a third, unrelated country.16
The third stage, taking place between 1965 and 1973, brought over
680,000 refugees, half of which arrived on flights permitted by an
agreement between Cuba and the United States. 7 The fourth stage,
beginning in 1973, after Cuban termination of flights to the United
States, marked a significant decrease in immigration.' s The methods of
departure once again returned to "clandestine escapes" and travel to
countries where it was still permitted. '9 This stage continued through the
beginning of 1980 and would be followed by the largest flow of

7.
8.
9.
10.

See id.
See THOMAS, supra note 2, at 1033.
See id. at 1026.
See ALEJANDRO PORTES & ROBERT L. BACH, LATIN JOURNEY: CUBAN AND MEXICAN
IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES 85 (1985) (delineating five main stages of immigration from
Cuba to the United States beginning upon the departure of Batista and his supporters).
11. See id.; see also Cuban Am. Bar Ass'n v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412, 1417 (1 th Cir.
1995) (citing the 1994 influx of refugees eventually detained at the Guanuinamo Naval Base).
12. See PORTES & BACH, supranote 10, at 85-86.
13. See id.
14. See id. at 86.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See id.
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immigration experienced since shortly after the Castro government took
power.
The fifth stage of immigration occurred entirely during 1980 and
brought almost 125,000 refugees to American shores via the Carter
administration's "open hearts and open arms" policy. 2' Former President
Carter "extended an invitation to those Cubans seeking refuge to come
to the United States. 22 Castro allowed departure through the Cuban port
of Mariel, giving rise to the name "Mariel Cubans" or Marielitas for the
refugees.'
Finally, the sixth stage encompasses the most recent period of
massive immigration. On August 13, 1994, the Castro government
announced that Cubans wishing to leave would not be prevented from
doing so.24 The announcement caused an influx of over 30,000 refugees
departing from the island in small boats and rafts.' Many refugees risked
their lives attempting to reach American soil. 26 The United States
responded by announcing that Cuban refugees attempting to reach the
United States would be intercepted. 27 In contradiction to thirty years of
immigration policy granting Cuban refugees passage, the United States
sent the interdicted refugees to Guantdnamo naval base in Guantdnamo
Bay, Cuba.2
The immigration crisis eventually culminated in the New York
Agreement. 29 In this agreement, the United States promised to accept at
least 20,000 immigrants a year in exchange for Cuban government
efforts to prevent citizens from leaving Cuban shores.3 A companion to

20. See id. at 86-87.
21. See id.
22. Yvette M. Mastin, Sentenced to Purgatory:The Indefinite Detention of Mariel Cubans, 2
SCHOLAR 137, 142-43 (2000).
23. See id. at 143.
24. See Maria E. Sartori, The Cuban Migration Dilemma: An Examination of the United
States' Policy of Temporary Protection in Offshore Safe Havens, 15 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 319, 328
(2000).
25. See id.
26. See Cuban Am. Bar Ass'n v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412, 1417 (11 th Cir. 1995).
27. See id.
28. See id. (citing the Agreement for the Lease to the United States of Lands in Cuba for
Coaling and Naval Stations, Feb. 23, 1903, U.S.-Cuba, art. Il, T.S. No. 418 as the authority under
which the United States maintains "complete jurisdiction and control" of the naval base while
acknowledging the ultimate sovereignty of Cuba over the land).
29. See Roberto Suro, U.S., Cuba Agree on Stemming Raft Tide, NVASH. POST, Sept. 10, 1994,
at Al.
30. See id.
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the New York Agreement was entered into on May 2, 1995.3 This
agreement established the current United States policy of repatriating
interdicted Cubans to their homeland and contained Cuban government
promises that no reprisals will be had against the interdicted refugees for
their attempts to escape. 32 The current policy instituted by the
immigration agreement of May 2, 1995 has evolved into what has been
called the "Wet Feet, Dry Feet" policy, termed such because repatriation
occurs if the Cubans are interdicted in the water by the U.S. Coast
Guard.33
The Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966 ("CAA") was the United
States' response to the pervasive problem of Cuban immigration and the
issues raised by those migrations since 1959.4 The CAA grants the
Attorney General discretion to adjust the status of a Cuban refugee,
present in the United States for at least one year, to that of a permanent
resident-the status required to apply for citizenship.35 Enacted almost
four decades ago, the legislation has proven itself durable and flexible in
the tumultuous political relationship of the United States and Cuba.
The current immigration policy providing for the interdiction and
36
repatriation of Cuban refugees under the May 2, 1995 migration accord
diminishes the effectiveness of the CAA. The purpose of this Note is to
advocate the enforcement of the CAA as legislatively intended without
the arbitrary limitation of the "Wet Feet, Dry Feet" policy and provide
justifications for the continued acceptance of Cuban refugees under the
CAA.
Part II explicates the policy considerations contained within the
legislative history supporting the fiat of the CAA. Part III proposes
modern justifications for the CAA and contends that American trade
sanctions against Cuba spawn a duty to provide haven for Cuban
refugees. Alternatively, it advocates the cessation of economic sanctions.
Part IV calls for the enforcement of the CAA as originally intended

31. See Joint Statement on Migration, May 2, 1995, U.S.-Cuba, 6 DEP'T ST. 397 (1995)
[hereinafter Migration Agreement]; see also INS 800 Number on Cuban Migrant Interdiction
Process, United States Coast Guard Office of Alien Interdiction, available at
http:llwww.uscg.millhq/g-og-opl/mle/ins8OO.htm (last visited Aug. 20, 2002) (providing a
transcript of the INS toll free recording explaining the Migration Agreement).
32. See Migration Agreement, supra note 31, at 397.
33. See Sartori, supra note 24, at 353.
34. See Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161 (1966) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1255
(2000)).
35. See id.
36. See Migration Agreement, supra note 31, at 397.
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while distinguishing the Cuban refugee situation from that of other
refugees in order to refute claims of inequity and discrimination.
II.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CAA 37

The CAA effectively allows Cuban exiles to circumvent the usual
methods used to determine refugee status and their conversion from
refugee to permanent resident. 33 The CAA grants the Attorney General
discretion to adjust the status of a Cuban citizen admitted39 or paroled"
into the United States who has maintained a physical presence for at
least one year to the status of an "alien lawfully admitted for permanent
residence., 4 ' This distinct treatment of Cuban immigrants has been
considered by some to be "preferential. 42 To understand the reasoning
behind the creation of this "preferential treatment, ' 43 a review of the
legislative underpinning and policy concerns is necessary.
A.

Humanitarianand PracticalReasons

The first policy concern behind enactment of the CAA was for
"humanitarian and practical reasons." Existing law prior to the
enactment of the CAA forced Cuban refugees living in the United States
and wanting to adjust their status to permanent residency to follow the
"awkward procedure" of departing the United States, traveling to a
consular office, applying for an immigrant visa there, and only upon
approval, returning permanent residents. 45 The United States government
37. Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161 (1966) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1255

(2000)).
38.

See THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., I.MMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS

AND POLICY 987 (4th ed. 1998) (stating that a refugee may gain the status of permanent resident
through either "overseas refugee programs" or "political asylum").
39. See BILL ONG HING, I1,5IGRATION AND THE LAW: A DICTIONARY 42 (1999) (defining
"admission" as the "lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and
authorization by an immigration officer").
40. See id. at 244 (defining individuals that are paroled as not eligible for admission but,
instead of repatriation, the immigration inspector allows them to travel in the country for limited
purposes).
41. Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Star. 1161 (1966) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1255

(2000)).
42. See Note, The Cuban Adjustment Act Of 1966: Mirando PorLos Ojos De Don Quijote 0
Sancho Panza?, 114 HARV. L. REV. 902, 906 (2001) [hereinafter Cuban Adjustment Act].
43. Id.
44. H.R. REP. No. 1978, at 4, reprintedin 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3792, 3795 (citing a letter by
Under Secretary of State George Ball in which he states that the help provided by the "proposed
legislation is being given for purely humanitarian and practical reasons").
45. See id. at 3, reprintedin 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3792, 3794; see also Silva v. Bell, 605 F.2d
978, 980-81 (7th Cir. 1979).
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acknowledged that termination of diplomatic relations with Cuba was
the reason Cubans had to travel to a third country in order to apply for
residency.46
Although at the time of enactment, 75,000 Cuban refugees had
chosen this "awkward procedure" as the path to residency, 165,000
Cuban refugees remained in the United States without permanent
status.47 The government acknowledged that existing law imposed a
great burden upon the refugees, as well as the United States consular
offices, which were insufficiently staffed to accept the influx of exiles.4 8
Through the enactment of the CAA, the government expected to reduce
government expenditures pertaining to Cuban refugees by permitting
Cuban natives or citizens to gain adjustment at the discretion of the
Attorney General while remaining in the United States.49 Concern by
legislators that the enactment would be perceived as the United States
acknowledging the permanency of the Castro leadership in Cuba was
relieved by Under Secretary of State George Ball when he assured the
Committee on the Judiciary ("Committee") that the help provided by the
"proposed legislation is being given for purely humanitarian and
practical reasons."50
B. Self-Sufficiency
The second aim of the enactment, cited in the legislative history,
was to provide a mechanism through which Cuban refugees would find
it easier to gain lawful employment.' Deputy Attorney General Ramsey
Clark, in a letter by the Department of Justice supporting the enactment
of the legislation, stated that it would remove obstacles preventing the
"self-sufficiency" of the refugees by increasing their probability to
obtain employment. 2 The interests of the United States would also be
promoted by allowing individual refugees to seek employment in
46. See H.R. REP. No. 1978, at 3, reprintedin 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3792, 3794; see also Joyce
A. Hughes, Flight from Cuba, 36 CAL. W.L. REV. 39, 44 (1999) (citing President Eisenhower
breaking diplomatic and consular relations on January 3,1961, shortly after the nationalization of
United States institutions operating within Cuba).
47. See H.R. REP. No. 1978, at 2-3, reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3792, 3793-94.
48. See id. at 3, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.A.N.N. at 3794; see also Silva, 605 F.2d at 981
(stating that many Cubans "arrived in this country in an impoverished state and were unable to pay
for a trip outside the United States to visit a consulate").
49. See H.R. REP. No. 1978, at 3, reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3792, 3793-94.
50. Id. at 4, reprintedat 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3795.
51. See id. at 3,reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3794 (stating that it will aid refugees "in
their resettlement by enhancing their opportunity to qualify for employment in all areas of the
Nation").
52. See id. at 8-9, reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3798.
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professions of their choice, making the resettlement process less
burdensome upon the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and
providing for more qualified employees in the labor force,
53 especially in
areas where manpower shortages were present at the time.
C. Haven Provisionfrom Persecution
Finally, the third policy behind the enactment was to provide a
mechanism for refugees to escape the political persecution of
Communist countries!" The provision of relief from persecution served
two policy goals.5 The first dealt with providing protection for those
politically persecuted under the Communist government of Cuba.56 The
committee cited previous enactments providing for the aid of persecuted
persons as precedent for such socio-political legislation.5 7 Authority cited
in the Committee report referred to legislation passed on behalf of
Hungarian refugees and for refugees fleeing Communist countries
outside of the Western Hemisphere."
The second goal of providing haven from Communist Cuba is not
clearly stated in the legislation, but well established by history. The post1960's relationship between the United States and Cuba is one
intertwined with the Soviet Union and the Cold War. 9 Castro's
declaration of his Marxist-Leninist beliefs shortly after the United
States-supported invasion at the Bay of Pigs 60 had been considered a call
for support from the Communist nations. 6' The United States policy
against Communist expansion was promoted by allowing the Cubans
who came to the United States to denounce communism through finding
53. See id. at 9-10, reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 3798, 3800 (discussing employment
advantages of the CAA and also citing a letter by Wilbur J. Cohen, Under Secretary of the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare, where he states that there is a shortage of medical
professionals in the country).
54. See id. at 3, reprintediz 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 3794-95; see also Mathew A. Pingeton,
United States hnImigration Policy: Detaining Cuban Refitgees Taken from the Sea, 8 J. TRANSNAT'L
L. & POL'Y 329,329 (1998).
55. See H.R. REP. No. 1978, at 3, reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3792, 3794-95; see also
FELIX ROBERTO MASUD-PILOTO, FROM WELCOMED EXILES To ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS 24-29
(1996).
56. See H.R. REP. No. 1978, at 3, reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3792, 3794-95.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See MASUD-PILOTO, supra note 55, at 24-29.
60. The Bay of Pigs is the translation of Cochinos Bay in Cuba, the landing point of the failed
invasion which brought 1200 men comprised of Cuban ex-patriots trained by the United States in
order to invade and hopefully incite rebellion within the country to overthrow Fidel Castro. See
THOMAS, supra note 2, at 1355-71.
61. See Hughes, supra note 46, at 45.
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refuge in the democratic United States while at the same time draining
Cuba of vital resources such as an educated labor force. 62 The departure
from Communist Cuba to the democratic United States by refugees was
considered a vote against Communism and a vote for democracy. 6
Modern support for this proposed legislative intent is found in the repeal
that
of the CAA being conditioned upon determination by the President
6
Cuba.
within
power
in
is
government
elected
a democratically
III.

MODERN RATIONALIZATIONS FOR THE CAA

The modem justifications for the CAA generally fall under two
categories: modem political persecution and humanitarian concerns.
These categories are comprised of rationalizations at the time of
enactment that are still pertinent, as well as independent, current
justifications.
A.

Modem PoliticalPersecution

The political persecution, which the CAA was enacted to alleviate,
continues to exist in Cuba. Amnesty International, an organization which
campaigns for the advancement of human rights,66 raised concerns over
the persecution of Cuban citizens in a letter sent to the Cuban
government dated January 16, 2001: "'The increasing number of people
jailed for peacefully exercising their rights to freedom of expression,
clearly demonstrates the level to which the government will go in order
to weaken the political opposition and suppress dissidents."' 6 In
addition, Amnesty International, in its Annual Country Report for 2001,
classified Cuba as a country in which "[ilndividuals and groups
62. See Read Sawczyn, Note, The United States Immigration Policy Toward Cuba Violates
EstablishedMaritime Policy, It Does Not CurtailIllegal hnmigration, and Thus Should Be Changed
So That Cuban Immigrants Are Treated Similarly To OtherImmigrants, 13 FLA. J. INT'L L. 343,
347 (2000); see also Malissia Lennox, Note, Refugees, Racism, and Reparations:A Critique of the
United States' HaitianImmigration Policy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 687, 712 (1992).
63. See MASUD-PILOTO, supranote 55, at 33.
64. See Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 606, 110 Stat. 3009-176 (1996) (providing the method for
determination of a democratically elected government to be made by the President under section
203(c)(3) of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (Pub. L. No.
104-114)).
65. See discussion infra Part II.A-D.
66. See Amnesty Int'l, About Al, at http://www.web.amnesty.org/web/ aboutai.nsf (last visited
Aug. 20, 2002) (providing a mission statement from Amnesty International regarding their
campaign).
of
Political
New
Wave
Int'l,
Cuba:
67. Amnesty
Oppression, Jan. 16, 2001, availableat http://web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/Index/AMR25001200 1?Open
Document&of=COUNTRIES\CUBA (last visited Aug. 20, 2002).
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peacefully exercising their rights to freedom of expression, association
and assembly continued to face repression. 63 The country report also
asserted, "[t]he authorities continued to use short term detention, house
arrest, threats and harassment to stifle and discourage political dissent. 6 9
The State Department recently acknowledged the continuance of
persecution in its "Cuba: Country Report on Human Rights Practices2000."70 The Cuban government prohibits criticism of Fidel Castro, the
National Assembly of Cuba and the Revolution.7 ' Laws that have been
enacted against such actions carry penalties that vary from three months
to three years of incarceration.72 Penalties of up to fourteen years
imprisonment exist for "disseminating enemy propaganda." 73
Governmental pressure has been exerted upon religious entities as well.74
They have been pressured to avoid political topics." Certain churchrelated publication activities have even been classified as
counterrevolutionary.76
Human Rights Watch, the largest human rights organization based
in the United States,77 noted in its "2001 World Report" that, although
human rights conditions in Cuba have slightly improved, the country
remains repressive.76 Cuba continued to deny "freedom of expression,
association, assembly, movement, and of the press. ' 79 The government

68. Amnesty
Int'l,
Report
2001:
Cuba,
available
at
http:llwww.web.amnesty.orglweb/ar2OOl.nsf/webamrcountries/CUBA?OpenDocument (last visited
Aug. 20, 2002).
69. Id.
70. See U.S. Dep't of State, Cuba: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices-2000,
available at http:llwww.state.govlgldrllrlslhrrpt/20001whalindex.cfm?docid.=751.htm(last visited
Aug. 20, 2002) [hereinafter Human Rights Practices]; see generally Steven C. Poe et al., How Are
These Pictures Different? A Quantitative Comparison of The US State Department and Amnesty
hIternational Human Rights Reports, 1976-1995, 23 HuM. RTs. Q. 650 (2001) (proposing that
although Amnesty International reports and State Department reports regarding human rights
violations have differed as to their findings in the past, reports have been found to be increasingly in
agreement in recent years).
71. See Human Rights Practices, supra note 70.
72. See id.
73. Id.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. See
Human
Rights
Watch,
About
HRW,
available
at
http://www.hrw.org/aboutwhoweare.html (last visited Aug. 20, 2002).
78. See Human Rights Watch, World Report 2001: Cuba, available at
http:llwwvw.hrw.orgvr2kllamericas/Cuba.html (lastvisited Aug. 22,2002).
79. Id.
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also criminalized freedom of speech under the claim of "protecting state
security."8 °
Arguments have been advanced questioning the validity of the
CAA, claiming that economic conditions, and not political persecution,
are the driving force behind Cuban immigration."' Undoubtedly,
economic conditions play a predominant role in the refugee situation,
but persecution is apparent and should not be selectively ignored by the
government in order to deny entryY. An additional disputation of the
continued enforcement of the CAA is enmeshed with the Soviet Union's
withdrawal of military and economic assistance from Cuba at the
conclusion of the Cold War. 3 It has been correctly asserted that the
withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Cuba extinguished the indirect
purpose of thwarting communist expansion in the Americas served by
providing safe haven through the CAA. 4 What the argument falls to
acknowledge is that dissuading communist expansion by allowing
Cuban refugees to escape to the United States, in turn draining Cuba of
an educated labor force, was but one indirect goal of the CAA.Y The
eradication of the mission still leaves the set purpose of providing haven
for the sake of protection from communist nations, which the legislative
history directly stated as a justification. 6 Moreover, the legislators
provided precedent for taking such actions.8 ' As long as the welldocumented persecution in Cuba persists, the CAA continues to serve a
valuable role in ensuring a mechanism through which persecuted
persons may find relief. Additional support justifying the continued
enforcement of the CAA as originally intended is found in the current
state of humanitarian conditions within Cuba.
B.

HumanitarianConcerns

The economic condition in Cuba is dismal. The country is eleven
billion dollars in debt.8 8 The economy receded thirty-five percent in 1989
after Soviet economic support amounting to four billion dollars a year
80. Id.
81. See Cuban Adjustment Act, supra note 42, at 912-13.
82. See supra text accompanying notes 66-80.
83. See CubanAdjustment Act, supra note 42, at 911-12.
84. See id.
85. See Sawcyzn, supra note 62, at 347.
86. See H.R. REP. No. 1978, at 3, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3792, 3794; see also
Pingeton, supra note 54, at 332.
87. See H.R. REP. No. 1978, at 3, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3792, 3794-95.
88. See Karen DeYoung, Cuba Climbs Economic Ladder: Lack of Investment, Extensive Food
hnports Slow Reform, WASH. POST, July 24,2000, at A20.
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was terminated." Although the economy has made small strides towards
normalcy, Cuban citizens have paid a serious price.9" The average
monthly salary in American dollars amounted to $10.52 in 2000."'There
are chronic shortages of medical supplies and governmental food rations
have been deemed to be less than half of what is necessary.92
It is undeniable that many seek to depart Cuba based on economic
conditions, yet this relief is not available under current immigration
regulations. Immigration law does not grant refugee asylum based on
economic reasons.93 The statutory definition of a "refugee" eligible for
asylum is "any person who is outside any country of such person's
nationality ...unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the
protection of, that country because of persecution... on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion. 94 This legal requirement has been used to support arguments
against the continued acceptance of Cuban refugees, claiming that most
are economic refugees failing to meet the required definition and are not
political refugees.95 Consequently, these refugees have been termed by
some as "consumer refugees."96 The refusal to allow economic refugees
from Cuba, however, is counterintuitive.
The State Department acknowledges that Cubans seeking refugee
status, regardless of their basis for it, suffer economic strife.97 Support is
found in State Department reports that note the fees charged by the
Cuban Government for travel to the United States ($500 per adult and
$400 per child) are a "significant hardship," equivalent to about five
years of salary.98 Additionally, the refugee is also responsible for the
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. See id.; see also Human Rights Practices, supra note 70 (noting that Cuba's Labor Code
establishes the salaries of workers under the law).
92. See DeYoung, supra note 88 (stating the quantity of food per month as six pounds of rice
and sugar, one and a half pounds of legumes (half peas, half beans), one-quarter pounds of coffee,
one dozen eggs, one to two pounds of meat, one-eighth of a pound of cooking oil, one pound of salt,
one to two pounds of fish and less than three ounces of bread and approximately two pints of milk
per day).
93. See ALEINIKOFFETAL., supra note 38, at 986-87.
94. Immigration and Naturalization Act § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42)(A) (2000);
see also Garcia-Ramos v. INS, 775 F.2d 1370, 1373-74 (9th Cir. 1985) (describing the analysis of
"well-founded fear" as embodying a subjective standard for determination of "fear" relating to the
applicant's state of mind and an objective standard for the determination of "well-founded" related
to finding a basis of reasonable possibility of persecution).
95. Cuban Adjustment Act, supranote 42, at 913.
96. Id.
97. See Human Rights Practices, supra note 70.
98. See id.
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airfare to the United States.99 This is a great obstacle, as most Cuban

refugees have trouble obtaining food and medical treatment, much less
the requisite funds to leave the country."' This state of political and
economic affairs creates a paradoxical situation.
C. The Paradoxof the Economic Refugee
In Abraham Maslow's Theory of Human Motivation, Maslow
suggests five categories of general human needs, ordered by priority of
satisfaction.'0 ' The needs are ordered as follows: physiological and
biological needs, safety needs, love or belongingness needs, esteem
needs, and finally, self-actualization or needs for self-development',The first need, physiological, is comprised of biological necessities
for survival, including food, air, and water.' 3 Maslow describes these as
"the most prepotent of all needs."' 4 He also states that an individual
lacking "food, safety, love, and esteem would most probably hunger for
food more strongly than for anything else."'0 5 The next necessity along
Maslow's hierarchy consists of the "safety needs."' 6 These are
characterized by the human necessity of security, protection and the
need for structure and law, to name a few.' 7 Only upon satisfaction of
this requirement would an individual become concerned with the
satisfaction of Maslow's third level of needs, belongingness and love
needs.'0 8 Love needs are related to the development of affectionate
familial relationships as well as relationships in general.' °9 The fourth
level of Maslow's hierarchy, reached upon fulfillment of love needs, is
esteem needs."0 Esteem needs are related to the desire for positive selfrespect and self-esteem, as well as the esteem of others."' Finally, the
and is
paramount of the hierarchy is termed "self-actualization"
2
1
affiliated with the full achievement of one's potential."

99. See id.
100. See id.
101. See ABRAHAM H. MASLOW, MOTIVATION AND PERSONALITY 35-47 (2d ed. 1970).
102. See id.
103. See id. at 35-36.
104. Id. at36.
105. Id. at 37.
106. Id. at 39.
107. See id.
108. See id. at 43.
109. See id.
110. See id. at 45.
111. See id.
112. See id. at 46.
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As previously stated, only upon satisfaction of a prior need does the
individual become concerned with the gratification of the next
hierarchical need." 3 More clearly, Maslow states, "[tihe merely
surviving man will not worry much over the higher things of life... the
right to vote, the good name of his city ...he is primarily concerned
with more basic goods."' 4 In accepting Maslow's theory, it would be
paradoxical to deny an individual refugee status based on her
classification as an economic refugee. The situation that makes her an
economic refugee may be the obstacle preventing her from exhibiting
the necessary political persecution because she is consumed by
satisfying her physiological needs.
Additionally, a second paradox arises. The economic strife suffered
is partially caused by the marginalization of Cuban citizens who are not
members of the communist party in Cuba-the only allowed political
party based on the country's constitution."' Under Law 77, enacted by
the Cuban National Assembly in 1995 in order to promote economic
expansion through foreign investment, Cuban employees are contracted
by foreign investors through Cuban agencies." 6 This prohibits foreign
investors from selecting employees based on their criteria and instead
empowers the Cuban government to choose those citizens they feel
appropriate for employment." 7 The government also monitors employees
via the maintenance of an individual "Labor Record" which archives,
among other information, conduct relating to the political ideology of
the employee." 8 The potential for economic discrimination based on
political beliefs is inescapable upon recognizing that a one-party
government is determining who gains employment. Similarly, the
"Cumulative Academic Record" of students contains an assessment of
the students' and their parents' political and ideological conduct which
may potentially inhibit the opportunity of higher education or career
choice."9 The economic reasons behind seeking asylum, ironically, both
deny the individual haven under American immigration law, and also
serve as proof of the very persecution necessary to qualify for safe
113. Seeid.at70.
114. Id.
115. See Human Rights Practices, supra note 70.
116. See Veneta A. Gallousis, Note, Cuba's FlirtatiousLove Affair With Foreign Investment:
The Evolution of Laws 50 and 77, 5 TEX. Hisp. J.L. & POL'y 81, 94-95 (2001).
117. Seeid. at95.
118. See Alexia Elejalde-Ruiz, A Newshour with Jim Lehrer Transcript. Life in Cuba,
available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/latinamerica/cubalife.html (July 2001) (last visited
Oct. 2, 2002).
119. Seeid.
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haven. Unfortunately, the current "Wet Feet, Dry Feet" interdiction
policy does not acknowledge this paradox and is returning thousands of
20
refugees to political and economic persecution.
The counterargument can be made that the floodgates of
immigration from all countries with economic refugees would be opened
if these paradoxes were acknowledged and corrected. But the flow of
immigration could justifiably be limited to Cuban refugees since the
Cuban situation is distinguishable from that of other nations. Due to
United States trade sanctions against Cuba and the devastating impact
they have on the economic conditions within Cuba, a duty arises
incumbent upon the United States to enforce the CAA and accept
refugees without interdiction or alternatively, cease the embargo
altogether. 12
D. Creation of Duty
Another justification for continued enforcement of the CAA
without interdiction policies is also related to the humanitarian rationale.
The United States economic policies against Cuba create a duty to
refugees arising from the degradation of the Cuban economy caused by
unsuccessful economic sanctions against Cuba. 22 Economic sanctions
enacted since 1960123 and fortified by the Cuban Liberty and Democratic
Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 ' 24 (known as the Helms-Burton
Act) have debilitated the Cuban economy.'2 The embargo has cost Cuba
an estimated sixty-seven billion dollars 26 and placed Cuban per capita
food consumption last among Latin American countries. 27 The
economic repercussions also extend to the healthcare of Cuban citizens
through the lack of medical supplies and prescription medication.'2120.
121.
122.

See Sartori, supra note 24, at 326.
See discussion infra Part III.D.
See DONNA RICH KAPLOWITZ, ANATOMY OF A FAILED EMBARGO: U.S. SANCTIONS
AGAINST CUBA 1-6 (1998).
123. See id. at 2 (citing five different phases of embargo policy, beginning first with its
development from 1960 to 1962, then its expansion between the years of 1960 and 1970, followed
by limited efforts to reduce the scope during the years from 1971 to 1980, then returning to a
"tightening of the bilateral embargo" and finally the fifth stage, attempting to globalize the embargo
coupled with international resentment towards the policy).
124. See Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-114, 110 Stat. 785 (1996).
125. See Cuban Adjustment Act, supra note 42, at 920-21.
126. See William M. Leogrande & Julie M. Thomas, Cuba's Quest for Economic
Independence, 34 J. LATIN AM. STUD. 325, 357 (2002).
127. See Cuban Adjustment Act, supra note 42, at 920.
128. See id. at 920-21.
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It is widely-accepted in tort law that there is no duty to act to the
benefit of a party even if the harm caused is a foreseeable result of the
failure to act."2 9 An equivalent rule exists in criminal law, asserting that a
moral duty to engage in affirmative action does not create a legal duty to
do so. 3 Yet both areas of law account for situations that may create a
legal duty to act. Such a situation, according to criminal law, is a duty
based upon the creation of peril. 3' Such a relationship arises when a
person places another in a dangerous position. 3 2 If the acts placing the
other in peril are due to affirmative acts on behalf of the actor, it is
incumbent upon her to protect the potential victim from the created
harm.' The analogous rule in tort law goes a step further.'9 Tort law
places a duty upon the creator of peril, regardless of intent.' If the actor
is aware or should be aware of the peril created by her actions, she owes
a duty of reasonable care to the potential victim, regardless of fault.'36
The economic embargo instituted by the United States affirmatively
creates peril for the Cuban people. This peril manifests itself in the
forms of hunger and lack of necessary medical supplies; together, they
give rise to a duty to act. 3 7 Although the House and the Senate agreed in
October 2000 to end all "unilateral U.S. food and medicine embargoes"
instituted against "Cuba, Iran, Libya, Sudan and North Korea," Cuba
was singled out and prohibited from purchasing food and medicine on
credit.' This prohibition effectively maintained the embargo against
food and medicine sales since Cuba remains cash deficient.'39 The
absolute failure to meet any of the objectives of the economic embargo
provides additional support for the duty to accept Cuban refugees under
the CAA or more importantly eliminate the policy altogether.

129. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 853 (2000).
130. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAw 215 (3d ed. 2000).
131. Seeid. at218-19.
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. See DOBBS, supra note 129, at 856-57. It should be noted that a duty arising from
innocent acts is also found in criminal law but is not as widely accepted. See LAFAVE, supra note
130, at 218.
135. See DOBBS, supra note 129, at 856-57.
136. See id.
137. See supratext accompanying notes 126-28.
138. Karen DeYoung, Embargo Foes Feel Let Down on Cuba, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 2000, at
A16 [hereinafter Embargo Foes].
139. See id.
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E. The Failuresof the Economic Embargo
The goals of enforcing trade sanctions against Cuba have been
classified into six categories: (1) the removal of Castro; (2) retaliation
and compensation for the nationalization of American assets;
(3) containment of the revolution; (4) elimination of Cuban-Soviet ties;
(5) symbolizing American opposition; and (6) promoting change within
Cuba."' The first goal, overthrow, has obviously not succeeded.' 4' Castro
remains President and has arguably used the embargo to fortify his
stance against the United States. 42 The failure of the second goalretaliation and compensation for the nationalization of American
assets-was actually assured by the institution of an economic
embargo. 43 Indeed, by prohibiting trade, the United States eliminated the
source of income Cuba intended to use for underwriting the repayment
of seized assets.'4 In further support, various nations choosing not to
institute the failed policy
of sanctions have since settled their respective
45
claims.1
nationalization
The third goal-containment of the revolution-developed as a
response to the inability to remove Castro from power. 46 Once again, the
embargo failed to meet its objective. Cuba has remained active in its
47
support of populist left-wing movements throughout the Americas.'
Moreover, the embargo arguably increased the desire to promote
revolutionary change in the region. 48 The fourth goal, breaking ties
between the Soviets and Cuba, was to be accomplished by making the
relationship too financially burdensome to maintain. 49 Although the
embargo increased the costs of maintaining a relationship, it forced Cuba
into a closer and more dependent relationship with the Soviets.5

140. See KAPLOWITZ, supra note 122, at 3.
141. See id. at 3-4.
142. See id.
143. See id. at 4-5.
144. See id. at 4 (stating that the Cuban government planned to use twenty-five percent of trade
earnings to pay off nationalization claims).
145. See Duncan Campbell, Bacardi Accused of Campaign to Oust Castro: Rum Company
Boss "BankrolledCIA Mission to Kill Cuban Leader," GUARDIAN (London), Aug. 15, 2002, at 3.
146. See KAPLOWITZ, supra note 122, at 5.
147. See id.
148. See id. at 5 (stating "that the U.S. embargo imbued Cuba's internationalist zeal with even
greater urgency, born of Cuba's need to compensate for the perceived threat and concrete economic
disturbance the embargo produced on the island").
149. See id. at 6.
150. See id. (estimating the debt owed to the Soviets by Cuba to be in the range of twenty to
thirty billion dollars and total Soviet assistance between sixty and eighty billion dollars).
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The value of the fifth goal, symbolizing American opposition to the
revolution has diminished in importance."' Any benefit from
demonstrating to the citizens of the United States and the international
community that American resolve would not accept the Castro2
existed.1
government has outlived whatever usefulness had arguably
The international disapproval to the policy has manifested in the United
Nations voting in condemnation of the embargo for five consecutive
years dating from 1992 to 19972" Domestically, polls have indicated
that a majority of American citizens favor "reestablishing diplomatic and
economic relations."'' Finally, the utter failure of the sixth goalcreating internal change within Cuba-cannot be denied.'
The embargo has failed to meet any of its goals and instead
manifests itself as a punishment for the people of Cuba. The persistence
of Helms-Burton in light of its categorical failures portrays the
legislation as the codification of a monumental grudge, leaving eleven
million Cuban citizens to suffer the pervasive repercussions. The United
States has a duty to alleviate the harm it has created either by eliminating
the policies perpetuating such harm or by accepting the refugees under
the CAA as originally intended. One of the underlying rationales
supporting the enactment of the CAA provides an example for United
States acknowledgement of such a duty.
American foreign policy, namely, the termination of diplomatic
relations with Cuba in 1962, created a hardship since Cubans seeking
asylum would have to reach a third country in order to establish a
refugee claim as prescribed by United States immigration laws.'5 6 The
CAA instead eliminated the requirement of applying for asylum in a
third country, in part to alleviate the hardship the United States created
by terminating diplomatic relations.'57

151. See id. at 7-8.
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. Id. at 8.
155. See id. at 8-9.
156. See H.R. REP. NO. 1978, at 3, reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3792, 3794; see also
Hughes, supra note 46, at 44 (citing President Eisenhower breaking diplomatic and consular
relations on January 3, 1961 shortly after the nationalization of United States institutions operating
within Cuba).
157. See H.R. REP. No. 1978, at 3, reprintedin U.S.C.C.A.N. 3792, 3794.
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STRICT ENFORCEMENT OF THE CAA

The rationale provided during the creation of the CAA supported its
enactment and modern justifications promote its continued enforcement.
The enforcement of the CAA as intended is necessary for its desired
results to be realized. The intrusion of other immigration policies such as
15 policy arbitrarily
the "Wet Feet, Dry Feet""
denies entry into the United
States for individuals that otherwise would be deserving under the CAA.
A.

Wet Feet, Dry Feet

Current immigration policy toward Cuban refugees requires Cubans
to reach United States soil in order to invoke the CAA, otherwise known
as the "Wet Feet, Dry Feet" policy. 9 If intercepted at sea, refugees are
returned to Cuba unless they are found to have a "credible fear of
persecution", in which case they are taken to Guantdnamo naval base
and granted a second interview.'9 If during the second interview it is
determined that a "fear of persecution" exists, they are then transferred
to a third country. 6 ' If no "credible fear of persecution is determined" to

exist, the refugee is automatically repatriated to Cuba.162 The "Wet Feet,
Dry Feet" interdiction policy is used to circumvent the CAA since in
order to invoke the CAA, a refugee has to be within the United States.'
Besides the questionable legality of interdicting refugees at sea,64
whether or not a Cuban refugee is discovered in the water or on land has
no logical relation to the reasons why she seeks to invoke the CAA and
the policy advances behind its legislation. Furthermore, interdiction
creates additional hardships. 6 1 Interdicted refugees must establish a
"credible fear of persecution" in order to prevent repatriation.'16 This
standard is comprised of two prongs.'67 The first entails determining
158. See Sawczyn, supra note 62, at 348-49.
159. See Migration Agreement, supra note 31.
160. See id.; see also INS 800 Number on Cuban Migrant Interdiction Process, supra note 31.
161. See INS 800 Number on Cuban Migrant Interdiction Process, supra note 31.
162. See Clinton Administration Reverses Policy on Cubans, 72 No. 18 Interpreter Releases
622, 622-23 (May 8,1995).
163. See supra text accompanying note 33.
164. See Sawczyn, supra note 62, at 351-52 (arguing that Cuban refugees found in the
territorial waters of the United States are there for purposes of "innocent passage" and therefore the
Coast Guard has no right to interdict since passage does not threaten national or international
security).
165. See Bill Frelick, U.S. Refitgee Policy in the Caribbean:No Bridge over Troubled Waters,
20 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 67, 72-73 (1996).
166. See id.
167. See id. at 72.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol30/iss4/4

30

Brody: The Twilight of Organizational Form for Charity: Musings on Norma
THE CUBAN ADJUSTMENTACT OF1966

20021

whether there exists a "substantial likelihood" the refugee is being
truthful.' 3 The second prong requires making the determination of
whether or not the claimant would have a "reasonable possibility of
establishing.. .a well-founded fear of persecution.' ' 69 The "substantial
likelihood" standard required in the first prong is a much stricter test
than required by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR",).170
The UNHCR standard states that "a refugee claimant should be
granted the benefit of the doubt if his or her statements are coherent and
plausible and do not run counter to generally known facts."''7 ' The
UNHCR standard takes into consideration the possibly stressed nature of
the refugee's mental state and the difficulty experienced in providing
evidentiary support for the refugee's claim. 172 The United States
interdiction standard does not take either of these concerns into
consideration. 7 1 Ponder for a moment the insurmountable fear and
despair, which must engulf someone when deciding to navigate sharkinfested tropical waters on a congested makeshift raft-the failure to
grant consideration for a refugee's mental state becomes reprehensible.
In addition to requiring stricter standards in order to avoid repatriation, it
is also argued that performing an asylum hearing on board a Coast
Guard vessel by "shipboard adjudicators", as required by interdiction
policy, limits the opportunity for a fair hearing.' 74 Additional concerns
arise once refugees are determined ineligible for asylum and
repatriated.'75

168. See id.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id. at 72-73.
See id. at 73.
Id.
See id.
See generally Pub L. No. 89-732, 80 STAT. 1161 (1966) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.

§ 1255 (2000)).
174. Frelick argues:
Given the difficulty the courts have had in refining even less nuanced distinctions
between the "well-founded fear" standard for asylum and the "clear probability"
standard for withholding deportation, it seems unreasonable to expect a low-level INS
officer on the high seas to be able to make any meaningful distinction between assessing
if an asylum seeker has a "well-founded fear" (which they are not suppose to do) and
assessing 'the reasonable possibility of establishing a well founded fear' (which they are
suppose to do).
Frelick, supra note 165, at 7; see also Sawczyn, supra note 62, at 356 (stating that practically
speaking, an individual experiences a better chance to obtain asylum if that asylum is requested
within the country where it is sought).
175. See Sawczyn, supranote 62, at 356.
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One such concern is that repatriation prevents the refugee from
possibly obtaining refuge in a country other than the United States.'76 It
has also been proposed that the repatriation may leave the refugee open
to additional persecution, acknowledging that it is impossible to prevent
the Castro government from harassing repatriated refugees.
Repatriated refugees78 may also face fines of $500 each or suffer three
years imprisonment.
The CAA was instituted almost forty years ago to provide haven
from political persecution and for some, that persecution continues to
exist today.' 79 The CAA was also enacted to provide humanitarian
support for the Cuban people, also a necessity that persists today.'80 The
interdiction policies prevent the CAA from serving its intended role.
Unfortunately, enforcing the CAA as originally intended has come under
criticism by commentators, claiming that the CAA provides preferential
treatment to Cubans over other immigrants and it should therefore be
eliminated.'
B. Claims of PreferentialTreatment
The arguments claiming that the CAA provides favoritism for
Cuban refugees over other immigrants vary from claims of inequity
within American immigration policy to claims of racism. s2 It is an
inescapable fact that Cubans reaching United States soil and invoking
the CAA receive preferential treatment under the CAA.'83 Also
inescapable is the fact that racism plays a formidable role in the
formation of immigration law, a factor that has been attributed to the
restrictions placed on Cuban immigration in recent decades.'14 In order to
determine if the situation in Cuba, accounting for and supporting the
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. See UNHCR, World News: Cubans Who Didn't Reach U.S. Shores Have Little Choice Cuba
or
Haiti,
available
at
http://www.unhcr.ch/cgibin/texis/vtx/home/+RwwBmeuyrz.wwwwgwwwwwwwhFqnNObltFqnDni5AFqnN0blcFqnqlxw
MzmOwwwwwwwDzmxwwwwwwwdFqidGmnGaxOa-uPPyER0ayOIg/opendoe.htm
(June 11,
2001) (last visited Aug. 22, 2002).
179. See supra text accompanying notes 63-82.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 88-100.
181. See Hughes, supra note 46, at 69-70; Cuban Adjustment Act, supranote 42, at 914-17; see
also Cheryl Little, United States Haitian Policy: A History of Discrimination, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J.
HUM. RTS. 269, 289-94 (1993).
182. See CubanAdjustment Act, supra note 42, at 914-17.
183. See id.
184. See Kevin R. Johnson, Puerto Rico, Puerto Ricans, and Latcrit Theory: Commonalities
and Differences Benveen Latinalo Experiences, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 107, 125-26 (2000).
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favoritism, can be distinguished from the situations experienced in other
countries, an analysis is required. Most claims of preferential treatment
are based on the disparity between the treatment of Cuban immigrants
and the treatment of Haitian and Mexican immigrants.' Therefore,
distinguishing the situations among these countries would provide the
best foundation upon which to justify (if possible) the preferential
treatment.
The characteristic that most distinguishes the situation in Cuba
versus that in Haiti and Mexico is the existence of diplomatic and trade
relations between the United States and both the Mexican and Haitian
governments. Commitments by the United States to promote change
within Haiti have been prevalent, while any commitment for change in
Cuba on behalf of the United States has remained nonexistent.'
Additionally, Haiti receives the benefits of trade relations with the
United States as their largest trading partner.' 7 Haiti also received 1.04
billion dollars in funds from the United States between the years of 1995
and 2001 to be allocated to such programs as food assistance, health care
programs, and agricultural expansion.' 5 Contrarily, Cuba receives no
humanitarian funds from the United States government'89 and has been
prohibited from trading with the United States for almost half of its
existence as an independent nation.'9 0
Yet, although these distinguishing factors and the possibility for
political change exist within Haiti,'9 ' the social and economic strife
experienced within the country justifies a call for equivalent treatment.
The perpetual suffering experienced by the 7.5 million people in Haiti is

185. See id. at 124-25.
186. See Frelick, supranote 165, at 68. In June of 1994, American authorities detained massive
numbers of Haitian refugees fleeing Haiti due to political upheaval. See Chronology: A Recent
History of Haiti, N.Y. TwIEs, Oct. 16, 1994, at 18. By October 15, with United States military and
economic support, President Aristide, whose ouster from power by revolutionary forces caused the
political upheaval, was back in power and the political turmoil had subsided. See id.
Note:
Haiti,
available at
187. See
U.S.
Dep't of State,
Background
http:llwww.state.govlr/palbgnlindex.cfm?docid=1982.htm (last visited Aug. 20, 2002).
188. See id.
189. It should be noted that the United States offered humanitarian aid to Cuba after the
country was struck by a hurricane on November 4, 2001 although Cuba instead chose to purchase
food in cash under the eased sanctions pertaining to food. See Tim Padgett, Steaming Through the
Embargo, TIME, Dec. 24,2001, at 19; see also Embargo Foes,supra note 138.
190. See KAPLO\VrrZ, supranote 122, at 2.
191. Another difference between the two countries is found in the make-up of their respective
political systems. The State Department lists at least six different political parties within Haiti while
at the same time recognizing that Cuba only has one, the Communist/Socialist party. See
Background Note: Haiti, supra note 187; Human Rights Practices, supra note 70.
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beyond comprehension.' 92 What minimal infrastructure exists is in a state
of deterioration; for example, six out of ten Haitians are unable to access
potable water.' 93 One in twelve children contract the HIV virus every
year-the same virus that has orphaned an estimated 163,000 children. 9
Additionally, the nation is in the throes of a sixty percent unemployment
rate with those fortunate enough to have a job earning only 250 dollars a
year, on average.9 5 As conditions in Haiti worsen, hundreds of millions
of dollars are being withheld from the Haitian people via economic
sanctions instituted by the United States. 96 The sanctions came after
Haitian political elections in 2000 were met with accusations of
"electoral fraud.' 97 The need for legislation providing safe haven for
political and humanitarian purposes is self-evident.'98 Some members of
the Cuban community, along with others, have called for better
treatment of Haitian refugees' 99-a group that has suffered from poor
political representation in the United States. In the case of Haiti, the
preferential treatment provided under the CAA is obvious, but in
accomplishing equal treatment, it is imperative to fight for the legislative
equivalent to the CAA for Haitians and not equality through the
retraction of it.
Conversely, the diplomatic relationships the United States shares
with Cuba and Mexico justifies the preferential treatment under the CAA
for Cuban versus Mexican immigrants. Relations between the United
States and Mexico have only improved since the election of President
Bush.20 ' These improved relations translate into cooperation on issues
relating to the environment, drugs and most importantly, immigration.02
Trade between the United States and Mexico makes up ten percent of

192. See Canute James, Haiti Parties Inch Towards Reconciliation:A PoliticalImbroglio has
Left the Deprived Countr Worse Off than Ever, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), July 2,2002, at 2.
193. See id.; Sanjay Bhatt, Four From Haiti Land oz Jupiter Island: Political Deadlock in
HaitiSpurs More Inmigrants,PALM BEACH POST, Apr. 28, 2002, at 1C.
194. See Haiti: Review, AMERICAS REV. WORLD OF INFO., Sept. 23, 2002, at I (Comment &
Analysis).
195. See James, supra note 192.
196. See Liz Balmaseda, Refugees Face a Test of Faith,MIAMI HERALD, July 21,2002. at IA.
197. See Haiti:Review, supra note 194.
198. See generally Cheryl Little, InterGroup Coalitionsand Immigration Politics: The Haitian
Experience in Florida,53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 717 (1999).
199. See id. at 739.
200. See Little, supranote 181, at 317-18.
201. See James F. Smith & Esther Schrader, Mexico, U.S. Ties Warm in New Era, L.A. TIMES.
July 7, 2001, at Al.
202. See id.
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United States trade and accounts for eighty-two percent
of Mexican
20 3
exports and seventy-two percent of Mexican imports.

Preferential treatment exists for Cuban refugees under the CAA and
therefore provides for some inequity in American immigration laws.
However, the fact remains that immigrants not subject to the CAA and
returned to their home country benefit from relations maintained
between their respective countries and the United States. Cuban
immigrants forced to stay within Cuba do not experience these benefits
and therefore have no other recourse than to accept their situation or risk
government reprisal by fighting for change. 4
V.

CONCLUSION

As the Cuban Revolution triumphed, Senator Barry Goldwater
25
stated that the American public "shook their head in bewilderment.,
Now, more than four decades later, bewilderment seems an
understatement. In July 2002, Governor Jeb Bush appointed Raoul
Cantero III, the grandson of ex-Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista-the
reviled dictator overthrown by Fidel Castro and "Che" Guevara-to the
Florida Supreme Court.2 6 Mr. Cantero, having never served as a judge,
was an appellate attorney serving on such defense teams as that of
known terrorist-labeled such by the United States after participation in
over thirty terrorist acts-Orlando Bosch."" Mr. Bosch-a man referred
to by Mr. Cantero as a "Cuban Patriot"-was charged with the bombing
of a Cuban airliner in October 1976, the "single worst act of air terrorism
in the hemisphere" prior to the September 11, 2001, killing seventythree passengers including members and coaches of the Cuban national
fencing team among other Cuban citizens. 2 ' After serving eleven years
in a Venezuelan
prison, Orlando Bosch was acquitted of charges and
29
released.

It has been suggested that the lobbying efforts of the

American Ambassador to Venezuela at the time, Otto Reich, played a

203. See U.S. State Department,
Background Note:
Mexico, available at
http:llwww.state.gov/r/palbgnlindex.cfm?docid=183S (last visited Aug. 20, 2002).
204. See supratext accompanying notes 66-80.
205. See Louis A. Perez, Jr., Fearand Loathing of Fidel Castro:Sources of US Policy Toward
Cuba, 34 J. LATjN AM. STuD. 227, 229 & n.1(2002).
206. See Julie Hauserman, Choice a Swipe at Activist Court, ST. PETE TIMES, July 11, 2002, at
lB.
207. See id.; see also ANN LOUISE BARDACH, CUBA CONFIDENTIAL 200 (2002).
208. BARDACH, supranote 207, at 187-88; see also Hauserman, supranote 206, at lB.
209. See BARDACH, supra note 207, at 200.
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large role in his release.1 On January 11, 2002, President Bush
appointed Otto Reich as Assistant Secretary of State for the Western
Hemisphere, 211 considered by some as a "staunch anti-communist" who
as recently as 1999 advocated a Cuban policy similar in scope to
"economic warfare" in order to end communism in the country.1 Along
with assisting in the creation of the Helms-Burton Act, Mr. Reich has
also been a paid lobbyist for Bacardi, a Rum manufacturer that made
substantial political contributions to those working on the passage of
Helms-Burton. While Mr. Cantero's appointment may be classified as
ironic, 214 Mr. Reich's appointment is tragic and does not provide much
hope for any substantial change in the current policy. Any movements
toward the normalization of relations with Cuba are confronted with
negative reactions and unsubstantiated accusations.
In May 2002, as hopes for a "new period of greater understanding"
were raised by a pending visit to Cuba by former President Carter,
Under Secretary of State John Bolton accused Cuba of having a limiteddevelopmental biological weapons research and development-effort
capability and identified the country as member of the "axis of evil." 2"
The claim-though worthy of proclamation prior to President Carter's
visit-was interestingly not worthy of inclusion within the May 2002
Terrorism Report or a matter of concern for the Pentagon.2 6 The
"timely" comments by Under Secretary Bolton have been compared to
those made by Dan Fisk, a former aide of Senator Jesse Helms and
currently an underling of Otto Reich. 7 In September 2002, one week
prior to American companies departing for a trade presentation in
Cuba-the first since the embargo-Mr. Fisk accused Cuba of providing
false information regarding terrorist threats and wasting the time of
210. See id. (citing "half a dozen State Department cables" by Otto Reich lobbying for Orlando
Bosch).
211. See Johanna Neuman, The Nation: Anti-Communist Reich Given State Dept. Post, L.A.
TIMEs, Jan. 12, 2002, at A18.
212. Alfredo Corchado, Iran-ContraFigure Up ForKey Aide's Job; Critics Say His Views On
Cuba Could Hurt Relations With Mexico, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 4,2001, at 1 A.
213. See Alfredo Corchado, Castro Foes Bet Big as Donors; Study Details How a Few Cuban
Exiles Have Aided Key U.S. Lawmakers, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 20,2002, at IA.
214. Ironic, considering that many elder Cubans find themselves once again under the
governmental authority of a Batista.
215. See Daniel Schweimler, US and Cuba's Complex Relations, BBC NEws, May 9, 2002,
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1977839 (last visited Sept. 19, 2002).
216. See Hearing on U.S. Trade Policy Towards Cuba Before the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 107th Cong. (May 21, 2002) (statement of Sen. Ernest Hollings)
[hereinafter Senate Committee Hearing].
217. See David Adams, Spy Games Entrap Both Sides in Cuba Embargo Debate, ST. PETE
TIMES, Sept. 19, 2002, at 6A.
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enforcement agencies. 21 s The Cuban government denied the claim
vehemently and accused Mr. Fisk of "lying with impudence." 219 When
asked for confirmation of the claims, officials stated that the alleged
misinformation could not be divulged for security purposes.220
Nevertheless, Cuba has been utilizing its ability to purchase
American food products with cash, highlighted by the presentation of a
Food Expo near Havana on September 26, 2002 with almost 300
American companies in attendance.2' Ranked last among 228 countries
that bought food and agriculture from the United States in 2000, Cuba is
expected to move to forty-five by year-end 2002."2 However, the
requirement that food purchases be in cash reduces the potential relief
provided from the exception to the embargo, leaving substantial
future
3
changes in policy, if any, frustratingly distant and unclear.2
Immigration policies, regarding Cuban refugees over the last
decade, have served to dilute the strong policy justifications, past and
present, behind the CAA. The "Wet Feet, Dry Feet" policy serves no
rational purpose in the realm of Cuban and American immigration
policy other than to prevent immigration through the circumvention of
the CAA. The embargo preventing the economic expansion of Cuba
creates a recognizable duty upon the United States to enforce the CAA
as originally intended, or in the alternative, take affirmative steps to
alleviate the negative economic impact on the Cuban people. Should the
latter course be chosen, the initial step should be the lifting of economic
trade sanctions.
The embargo unnecessarily perpetuates the economic strife
experienced by Cuban citizens, increasing the need for escape from
Cuba without providing the United States any benefit in return.
Alternatively, if current policy towards Cuba remains steadfast, the only
hope Cuban citizens have to emancipate themselves from their situation
remains immigration. It is incumbent upon the United States to provide a
safety valve for the pressure cooker its policies create in Cuba, and only
218. See id.
219. See id.
220. See id. Additionally, during a hearing held by the Senate Commerce Subcommittee,
Senator Ernest Hollings questioned Mr. Reich as to the State Department's discouragement of food
purchases from Cuba to which he replied they neither encourage nor discourage sales to Cuba. See
Senate Committee Hearing,supra note 216. Senator Hollings went on to state that such "antipathy
of the State Department" has made what little food trade is allowed more difficult by taking actions
such as denying a travel visa for a Cuban representative of Alimport, the Cuban import agency. Id.
221. See Lizette Alvarez, U.S. Agribusiness Peddles to the Proletariatin Cuba, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 27, 2002, at A6.
222. See id.
223. See id.
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the CAA can serve that purpose. Policy makers should keep in mind the
words of Franklin D. Roosevelt, "[r]emember, remember always that all
of us, and you and I especially, are descended from immigrants and
revolutionists. 224
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